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No. 02-3536

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR FOUNDATION, INC., an
Illinois not-for-profit Corporation, GOOD SHEPHERD
MANOR GROUP HOMES, INC., an Illinois not-for-profit
corporation, and GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR, INC., an
Illinois not-for-profit corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
CITY OF MOMENCE, a Municipal Corporation, and
WILLIAM PETERSON, JAMES SAINDON, CHERYL
HESS, JAMES VICKERY, GERALD DENTON, STANLEY
JENSEN, DONNA STUDER, JOHN METZ, JAMES
MOODY in their official capacities as Mayor and Aldermen of
the City of
Monrrence,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appeal From The United States District Court For
The Central District Of Illinois
Case No. 01-CV-2105
The Honorable Judge Michael McCuskey

BRIEF OF THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL FAIR HOUSING LEGAL CLINIC AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS GOOD SHEPHERD
MANOR FOUNDATION, INC., GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR
GROUP HOMES, INC., and GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR, INC.

Ann L. Melichar, Senior Law Student
Melissa L. Williams, Senior Law Student
F. Willis Caruso
The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic
28 East Jackson Blvd., Suite 500
Chicago, IL 60604
312-786-2267
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Supporting Retrial
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AMICUS CURIAE STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Clinic is a legal clinic of The John
Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. The Clinic provides litigation and dispute resolution
training for law students and litigation and dispute resolution assistance to persons who complain of
housing discrimination in violation of federal, state, and local laws.
The Fair Housing Legal Clinic addresses the following issue in its brief:
Whether the trial court below erred by limiting the trial to a single theory of
intentional discrimination under Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq., and
thus refusing to permit plaintiffs to make a case as to defendant's failure to
reasonably accommodate.
The District Court's failure to recognize a cause of action for a local government's failure to
reasonably accommodate handicapped persons is a significant error, which operates to frustrate an
important policy objective of the Federal Fair Housing Act and this case should be remanded for
trial on this issue.
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ARGUMENT
Congress amended the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3604 et seq. (hereinafter FHA),
in 1988 to extend the protections previously afforded to other persons already protected by the Act
to persons with a disability. Of all the 1988 amendments to the Act, this was the least controversial
because the need to prohibit housing-related discrimination against persons with a disability was
uniformly regarded as necessary. See Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation, West
Publ. 2001, §11.13, page 11-69.
The FHA makes it illegal: "(1) to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of ... that buyer or
renter ... " and "(2) to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 1 in connection with such dwelling,
because of a handicap of that person." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2). Congress explicitly made the
FHA applicable to local governmental zoning, as well as other land use regulations and policies that
would restrict housing opportunities for persons with a disability .. H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 24
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185 (stating that the amendments "would also apply
to state or local land use and health and safety laws, regulations, practices or decisions which
discriminate against individuals with handicaps"); see also Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc.

v. City ofMilwaukee, 300 F3d 775 (7th Cir. 2002); Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F3d 381 (7th
Cir. 2001) and Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 1999),

1

Although the ADA does not explicitly define "services, programs, or activities," the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Act state that "Title II applies to anything a public entity does." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35,
App. A. The courts to have considered the issue have held that the ADA clearly encompasses land use
control decisions by local government entities. Regional Econ. Comfy. Action Program, Inc. v. City of
Middletown, 281 F.3d 333,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1769, 12 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1317 (2d Cir. N.Y.
2002) petition for cert. filed, No. 01-1624 (May 3, 2002); Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc.
v. City ofAntioch, 179 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999).
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citing Larkin v. Michigan Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
Congress intended for the FHAA to apply to zoning ordinances that restrict the placement of group
homes).
The way Congress legislated with respect to the protected class of persons with a handicap,
however, was unlike the mandates of the same law with respect to every other covered class of
individuals. Not only does the Act forbid discrimination against persons with a disability, 42 USC
3604(f)(2), but a completely separate section of the Act, 42 USC 3604(f)(3)(B) affirmatively
requires that "reasonable accommodations" must be made in "rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity
to use and enjoy a dwelling."42 USC 3604(3)(3)(b). This Court has expressly recognized, therefore,
that:
A violation of either act2 can be established by showing that the plaintiff was a
qualified individual with a disability, and the defendant either failed to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiffs disability or intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiffbecause ofher disability. Dadian v. Wilmette, 269 F3d 831 (7th Cir 2001),
citing Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 846-48
(7th Cir. 1999).
Good Shepherd attempted to assert both these theories ofthe City's violation of the FHA,
but the District Court concluded that a reasonable accommodation claim was simply unavailable.
(Order of April15, 2002, pp. 11-12). The District Court below twice erred with respect to Good
Shepherd's reasonable accommodation claim: first by completely refusing to permit the argument
and secondly (which logically followed once the first error was committed) by refusing to admit
evidence on the defendant's land use control and/or planning practices and policies. This was no
small error: refusal to recognize a separate cause of action for the City's denial of a reasonable

2

The reference to "either" is to either the Americans With Disabilities Act or the Federal Fair Housing Act,
as applied to a person with a disability.
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accommodation effectively eviscerates this additional protection that Congress expressly provided
for in the 1988 amendments to the FHA.
The Federal Fair Housing Act requires that an accommodation be made for a person with a
disability as long as the accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to provide a person
with a handicap an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see

also: Oconomowoc, supra, Dadian v. Wilmette, 269 F.3d at 838; Howard v. City of Beavercreek,
276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002); Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. ofAdjustment, 284 F3d 442,
457 (3d Cir. 2002); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, I24 F.3d 597, 603 (4th
Cir. 1997); Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City ofTaylor, Michigan, 102 F3d 781, 794 (6th Cir. 1996). As
this Court explained in Dadian, a public entity must provide a reasonable accommodation to a
qualified individual with a disability by making changes in rules, policies, practices or services,
when necessary, under either Title II ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.S. §
12131 et seq., or the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 et seq., codified,
respectively, at 42 U.S.C.S. § 12131(2); 42 U.S.C.S. § 3604.

Whether a requested accommodation is reasonable is highly fact-specific, and determined
on a case-by-case basis by balancing the cost to the defendant and the benefit to the
plaintiff. Whether the requested accommodation is necessary requires a showing that the
desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiffs quality of life by
ameliorating the effects of the disability. The overall focus should be on whether waiver
of the rule in the particular case at hand would be so at odds with the purposes behind the
rule that it would be a fundamental and unreasonable change. 269 F3d at 838.

See also Jankowski Lee & Associates. v. Cisneros, 91 F3d 891 (7th Cir. 1996), citing United States

v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F .3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994).
The burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the accommodation it seeks is reasonable on its
face. That is, that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the requested accommodation is "necessary" to
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afford "equal opportunity" because " ... a plaintiff is in the best position to show what is necessary to
afford ... (a person with a disability) ... an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing."

Oconomowoc, citing US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 152 L. Ed. 2d 589, 122 S. Ct.
1516, 1523 (2002). Once the plaintiffs have made this prima facie showing, the defendant must
come forward to demonstrate unreasonableness or undue hardship in the particular circumstances
because "a defendant municipality is in the best position to provide evidence concerning what is
reasonable or unreasonable within the context of the zoning3 scheme." I d.; see also Vande Zande v.

Wisconsin Dep't ofAdmin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
This Court has further clearly explained the burden shifting analysis that the district court
should employ below:
We begin by focusing on the definitions of the three key elements of a reasonable
accommodation: "reasonable," "necessary," and "equal opportunity." Whether a requested
accommodation is reasonable or not is a highly fact-specific inquiry ... (to determine) ... if it
is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it. VandeZande, 44 F.3d at
543. An accommodation is unreasonable if it imposes undue financial or administrative
burdens or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program. Erdman v. City of
Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960, 962 (1996)(intemal citations omitted). In assessing costs, the
court may look at both financial and administrative costs and burdens. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc.,
v. Howard County, MD, et al., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (1997). A zoning waiver is unreasonable if
it is so "at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a fundamental and
unreasonable change." Dadian v. Vi!!. OfWilmette, 269 F.3d 831,838-39 (2001).
Whether the requested accommodation is necessary requires a 'showing that the desired
accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiffs quality of life by
ameliorating the effects of the disability.'" Dadian, 269 F.3d at 838 (citing Bronk, 54 F.3d at
429). In other words, the plaintiffs must show that without the required accommodation they
will be denied the equal opportunity to live in .... (the residential neighborhood where they
seek to reside).
As to the first prong of necessity, the Court requires a direct linkage between the proposed
accommodation and the equal opportunity to be afforded the handicapped person. Bryant Woods
In the instant case, Good Shepherd's case concerning water service and land development policies is apart
from "zoning" strictly defined, but there are not substantive reasons to distinguish these varieties of land use
regulations.
3
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Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir 1997). In this case, the requested accommodation is
necessary, and the City indisputably knew that supplying water to the group home was a condition
precedent to the habitability of the group home because water supply is a basic requirement for a
residential Certificate of Occupancy. Even if Good Shepherd's request that the water not be turned
off (or that it be turned back on immediately) had not been reasonable, once Good Shepherd offered
to post an escrow account with the City during the pendancy of a determination as to whether Good
Shepherd did have to supply land and the water extension to their neighbors, then denying Good
Shepherd's request could accomplish no legitimate public health, or safety reason much less a
"significant" or "fundamental" one.
According to the next stage of the reasonable accommodation law, the Defendant must
prove that the Plaintiffs request is unreasonable, i.e. that it causes undue hardship for in the
particular circumstances. A "reasonable accommodation" is determined after balancing the local
government's interest in the challenged regulation against its obligation to modify certain valid
rules to accommodate the statutory rights of the disabled to equal housing opportunities. Bangerter

v. Orem City Corporation, 46 F.3d 1491, 1502 (lOth Cir. 1995). The burden for local government
is to demonstrate that the proposed accommodation, such as the one requested by Good Shepherd
today, is not reasonable, because it would "impose undue financial or administrative burdens" or
require a substantial or fundamental alteration in the existing statutory scheme. 4

Although it may be proper to condition use (as here, the water supply to the group homes was conditioned
by the city on Good Shepherd supplying land to their neighbors) any such condition may not be an abrupt
departure from the local government's otherwise applicable land use regulations or policies. Goffinet v.
County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40 (1976). Since, the City had no actual zoning authority, it tried to condition
the use of the homes on the only power it could exert, the water service. Article 1, section 15, of the Illinois
Constitution forbids governmental entities from taking for private purposes to increase profits of a private
entity. Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, 304 Ill. App. 3d 542
(5th Dist. 1999). Similarly, the Illinois Constitution forbids taking for private purposes to limit the expenses
of another private entity, as is the situation here, with the City compelling Good Shepherd to extend the
4
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The District Court stated several times that this case was not about zoning or land use
regulations. This was clear error. Local governmental regulations concerning water supply are land
use regulations. Ifthe City's land use policy required land owners to dedicate some of their land for
the sole purpose of supplying property and an easement to the adjacent land owner (the Jehovah's
Witnesses in this case), then the issue that the District Court should have considered was whether
Good Shepherd's requested accommodation was "so at odds with the purposes behind the rule that
it would be a fundamental and unreasonable change." Without permitting evidence on what the
City's policies/regulations regarding provision ofland, easements and water supply were, the Court
could not possibly reach the requisite factual determination of how disruptive or "at odds" with city
policies or fundamental policies Good Shepherd's request was.
Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc., v. City ofMilwaukee is instructive on this point.

There, the City of Milwaukee required that group homes be spaced a certain distance from one
another. When this regulation resulted in a group home for persons with a disability being
prohibited on a certain parcel, this Court required the City of Milwaukee to prove both the purpose
for the spacing requirement and why modifying it for the plaintiff would impose undue burdens on
the City or its regulatory scheme. Absent this showing by the City, this Court held that the City had
indeed failed to provide a reasonable accommodation required by the Fair Housing Act. Similarly,
in this case, the City of Momence, has not demonstrated how providing this accommodation, which
would allow disabled residents to live in the Good Shepherd facility during the pendancy of the
dispute, would cause undue financial and administrative burdens on the City of Momence. Without
demonstration of such proof, the City cannot successfully show that Good Shepherd's request is
unreasonable and thus, the City's denial of Good Shepherd's request was improper.
water and sewer to the edge of Jehovah Witnesses property purely for the benefit of the Jehovah Witnesses
and merely so that they may save money.

II

CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the District Court erred by refusing to allow evidence as to how the
City ofMomence's failure to reasonably accommodate Good Shepherd violated the Fair Housing
Act. As such, this Court should apply its reasonable accommodation analysis to this case and find
that in shutting off the water supply and refusing to accept an escrow account and/or to have the
water turned back on, the City of Momence denied the residents of Good Shepherd a reasonable
accommodation in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Respectfully submitted,
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